Why do brokers charge per share commissions to institutional traders? What determines the commission charge? The choice of per share commissions as a payment method is puzzling, as commissions are not the most natural way to charge for order execution because costs are not proportional to the trade size and commissions are supposed to deter trading. We contend that commissions, rather than representing a per share price of execution, constitute a convenient way of charging fixed fees for brokers' services. We develop a simple theoretical model of how brokers choose to allocate services to their clients. We claim that client payments are structured in the form of commissions for convenience and regulatory reasons; however, it is the total payments that determine a client's level of service from their brokers. Clients adjust the order flow routed to a particular broker and the per-share commissions to maintain the required payment for their desired level of service. Using a large data set of institutional trades, we investigate the distribution of institutional commissions analyze commissions by client and broker attributes. We find results that are consistent with our view of the commission contract.
Introduction
Why do brokers charge per share commissions for execution of institutional trades? The choice of per share commissions as a payment method is puzzling, as they are not the most natural way to charge for order execution. A per-share commission is not driven by marginal cost considerations because execution costs are not proportional to the trade size, and as a transactions cost, commissions are supposed to deter trading. 1 We contend that commissions, rather than representing a per share price of execution, constitute a convenient way of charging fixed fees for broker services provided to institutional clients. These services include difficult order execution, access to initial public offerings and information provision.
We assume that institutions prefer to hide their trading strategies from the market.
Consequently, in the absence of other considerations, institutions would like to disperse their total trading volume rather widely among many brokers. Empirically, however, we find that this conjecture does not hold. Using a proprietary data set of institutional trades we report that institutions concentrate the bulk of their trading with a small fraction of the brokers they deal with. The largest clients in our data use an average of 78 brokers, but execute 47.6 percent of their trades with their top five brokers. Smaller institutions concentrate their trades even more. The smallest institutions in our data execute 75.3 percent of their trades with their top five brokers. We refer to this phenomenon as the bunching of institutional trading.
We develop a model of the broker-client contract where the brokers provide a higher level of service to clients that provide them with the greatest total revenue. What makes the implications of the model interesting is the fact that there is a fixed supply of valuable broker services such as access to sell-side analysts information or IPO access.
Brokers allocate these services based on the total revenue provided by the client. The largest institutions such as Fidelity Investments provide enough total revenue to receive a high level of services from many brokers. But most institutions are faced with the decision to trade off the benefits of hiding their trading strategy by trading with many brokers against the benefits of concentrating their trading with a small set of brokers; becoming important clients to these brokers. The smaller the institution, the more they must concentrate their trades. The model outlines the conditions under which a bunching equilibrium can exist and provides analytical solutions for the equilibrium for a simple static example. In our framework, per share commissions are just a convenient way of determining the broker's total revenue.
The implications of the model are tested by examining institutional trading at the time when the broker's sell-side analysts' information is likely to be particularly valuable; when they change their recommendation (Elton, Gruber and Grossman, 1986; Womack, 1996) . Section 2 outlines our view of the per-share commission contract as a vehicle to account for the broker's total revenue from a client. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the empirical tests and section 5 concludes. Brennan and Chordia (1993) model per share commissions as an optimal risksharing contract. In their model, brokers wish to sell information to clients but the value of the information to the client is uncertain ex-ante. As a solution to this problem Brennan and Chordia (1993) postulate that the less risk-averse broker gives the information away to the more risk-averse client. If, ex-post, the information is useful to the client, the resulting trades reward the broker through commission dollars. However, this explanation is unlikely to explain institutional commission contracts. In the absence of forcing contracts, the high cost of monitoring every client's trade makes it easy for clients to cheat and execute the trades with the cheapest available provider of execution services, such as discount brokers. Moreover, this argument is unlikely to apply to institutions: optimal risk sharing may actually involve a large institution bearing most of the risk. Thus, the question as to why brokers charge per share commissions, particularly to institutions, remains an open one.
The commission contract
Perhaps one can view commissions as a linear incentive contract. In many principal-agent environments, the principal pays a commission based on performance measures that inform him ex-post of the effort being exerted by the agent ex-ante (Holmstrom 1979) . Linear contracts are optimal in situations where effort is multidimensional and contracts are long-lived (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987) . However, the incentive provision is unlikely to be the explanation for commission contracts, since the transaction size is determined solely by the principal (client) and is unlikely to serve as a performance measure of the agent (broker).
Linear contracts are used as payment for services when the impact of these services is hard to quantify, and thus hard to base on an objective performance measure: one example is advertising. In these cases, payments are based on an easily measurable variable that is under the full control of the client, so that the client determines the total payment. Then the agent chooses the quality of the service and the client chooses the amount he pays for it. These two strategy choices must be optimal in equilibrium. This concept is very similar to the product quality assurance argument of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1983) . In their paper, the equilibrium is such that a firm prices the product above its marginal cost, while maintaining high quality. People are willing to overpay (relative to cheaper competitors), as long as the quality is above some predetermined level. The firm has no incentives to save on quality provision, since it will ruin the stream of positive profits for the future. We contend that if the level of broker services replaces product quality, the institutional commissions contract fits nicely into the Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1983) framework. Equilibrium in this framework ensures that full service brokers provide the required level of service, and eliminates the possibility in the Brennan and Chordia' (1993) solution that clients could free ride on the brokers' services. In this framework commissions represent a simple and convenient way to pay for services provided by the brokers. Such services include basic execution service, execution service for more difficult trades, information provision, and access to IPOs underwritten by the broker.
Basic execution is a commodity, thus must be competitively priced. Discount brokers and electronic networks (ECNs) dominate the market for basic execution. This market is highly competitive: commissions in this market are 1-2 cents per share. In many cases institutions can even get even cheaper fixed-fee execution.
For other trades, the potential price impact is greater and the quality of execution depends on the amount of resources, such as the capital committed or trader search costs, the broker expends on execution. The broker's inherent quality, the skill of the trading desk, could also affect execution quality. Consequently, this segment of the industry provides a differentiated service, in a less competitive environment. While measures of execution quality are available (we will use some of them), these measures rely on assumptions about the trading environment, which can be disputed by the parties.
Information quality is even more difficult to define. On one hand, information quality certainly depends on the analysts' talent, for which the broker must pay the ongoing market rates. However, once the analyst works for the broker, the cost of generating information and dissipating it is small. On the surface it would appear that information is a public good, and thus no single individual would be willing to pay enough for its generation. This impression, however, is misleading. From any single client's perspective, the value of information he receives crucially depends on the timing of its transmission from the broker. Since information is supplied sequentially, not all clients are called at the same time. As a result, the broker has discretion on whom to call first. In financial markets, information is most valuable to those who receive it the earliest. Indeed, since prices adjust to reflect information imbedded in trades (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (1987) ), information loses its value upon receipt by additional market participants (Kyle 1985) . Thus, the scarce resource in this context is the client's place in the queue: the client who is called first by the broker gets the most valuable information, and should be willing to pay more for getting it.
Access to IPOs can be viewed in this context as a simple rebate program. Larger clients get larger allocations of better IPOs, and since these usually yield significant short-term returns, larger clients get larger rewards.
While brokers could charge each client explicitly for the scarce resources utilized in his providing these services, this might not be the most efficient contract. As an alternative, we present a static model of broker services, such as information provision, in which brokers compete for clients by setting explicit fees for places in the queue, while clients optimally self-select. We show that in equilibrium clients who value information the most, get it first, thus the equilibrium is efficient.
The efficient solution does not, however, explain why commissions dominate the payment of a lump-sum fee for a place in the queue for information. There are fixed fee alternatives to commissions in the market for information. One example is the multitudes of newsletters that are distributed to subscribers. Value Line offers several subscription rates: higher subscription fee ensures earlier information delivery. However, commissions have strong historical and regulatory roots. Minimal per share commissions were mandated first by the NYSE, and then by the SEC for over 100 years, until the industry was deregulated in 1975. The consequences of deregulation have been profound in the retail brokerage industry. Two alternative contracts, the fixed fee per trade charged by the discount broker and the percentage of assets managed fee employed by full-service brokers successfully coexist with the commission contract. Surprisingly, the fixed-fee execution contract provided by the discount broker and their institutional counterparts has not driven out commission contract in either the institutional market or the full-service retail market.
Another potentially important reason for the survival of the commission contract is the regulatory treatment of commissions paid by the buy-side institutions. Institutions compete, among other parameters, on their management fees. If an institution pays fixed payments for auxiliary services received from brokers, it must increase its management fees to cover them. Commissions, on the contrary, are deducted directly from the funds under management, thus do not necessitate raising management fees. This rationale is the driver behind the soft-dollar market, where commissions explicitly used as a payment for services that are unrelated to the execution of specific transactions.
Finally, psychology may play a role. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1980) applied to marketing suggests that a seller of a product or a service should present it in such a way that the buyer sees aggregate losses (one price) but segregated gains.
Charging a single price, that is small on a per share basis, and providing a slew of services in return is consistent with maximization of the buyer's perception of the broker's value added.
Our view of the commission contract
In our interpretation of the commission contract, commissions provide a convenient substitute for fixed fees. The average per share commission paid by an institution is just the ratio of the total payment required to obtain the chosen service level to the total share volume directed by this institution to the broker. Bunching or aggregating trades with a few brokers increases these brokers' revenues through the volume component of total revenue. Thus, there will be relatively little variation in the average per share commission charge. We proceed by presenting a simple model of competition between brokers, who must allocate their service capacity among institutional clients. Then we postulate and test empirical hypotheses derived from our view of commissions.
The Model
This purpose of this model is to show the existence of equilibria where brokers of different quality compete on fees, and clients select and pay for the amount of service they desire. Existence is shown in a one-period model, but any equilibrium that can be supported in a one-shot game can also be supported in a dynamic game. We outline the model in a simple 2 by 2 framework for analytical tractability, but we contend that the model could be extended to the case of many clients and brokers. The model also demonstrates that two types of equilibria are possible. In the first, the largest client dominates both brokers. Bunching exists is this equilibrium if the largest client chooses to use one broker proportionately more than the other. The second equilibrium proves the existence of a stricter definition of bunching; in this case each client is the largest trader with a particular broker. This case requires localized economies of scale. Finally, we contend that the payment for broker's services is not paid as a lump sum, but charged on a per share basis. Then the number of shares sent to a particular broker by a particular client determines the level of service the client receives from that broker.
Model setup: the institutions choice of services
There are two institutions, A and B, with different portfolio sizes. We assume that portfolio size is positively correlated with the value they derive from broker services.
These differential valuations are represented by Q A > Q B > 1. We also assume that there exist two brokers, who differ in terms of the quality of service they can provide. This quality is denoted by α j : j = [1,2] such that α 1 > α 2 ≥ 1. The level of service provided by broker j to client i is denoted by s ji
The total value of the services for client i is as follows:
Notice that:
which is positive if we assume that 
We further assume that brokers are limited in charging a fee per unit of service provided. We denote these fees, 
The FOC are: Solving for the optimal choices, we obtain:
and
Similarly:
The broker's optimization
The brokers must decide on the fees for their respective services in a simultaneous one-shot game. Brokers maximize their fees given the solution to the institutions choice problem and subject to the capacity constraints:
It is clear that without explicitly measuring the brokers' cost functions, the capacity constraint must be binding in equilibrium. This implies that the shadow prices of the capacity constraints must be equal 1, and both capacity constraints are satisfied as equalities. In other words, the brokers must solve the optimal capacity allocation problem. It is possible to model an additional stage in the game where brokers first choose their capacity. However, given the complete information nature of the game choice, a broker would never choose excess costly capacity. Thus we restrict our attention to the second stage of the game.
Consequently:
Equation (9a) specifies the reaction function of the first broker and (9b) that of the second broker. We set S 1 = S 2 = 1, so that we interpret each client's allocations as shares of the total broker's capacity. Substituting (6a,b) and (7a,b) into (9a,b) we conclude that in the
The equilibrium difference between the broker's fees is directly proportional to the difference in broker quality. The next step is to prove the existence of the equilibrium.
First we evaluate the reaction function of the first broker (9a) at F 2 =0, which yields:
We can show that F 1 (F 2 ) is a monotonically increasing concave function, which converges asymptotically to ( )
We cannot evaluate the reaction function of the second broker, (9b), at 0
we can evaluate it at 0 2 = F which yields:
Notice, that:
. We can show that the reaction function
is a monotonically increasing concave function that converges asymptotically to ( )
. These results imply that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game between the two brokers.
In this equilibrium, the largest client dominates both brokers. This is quite intuitive, since the marginal benefit of any combination is proportional to the client's size. This is the only equilibrium type possible given our current set of assumptions. This equilibrium exhibits bunching when the largest client uses less of the second broker's capacity than he does of the first broker's capacity.
It is possible to derive an alternative equilibrium in which bunching is so extreme that each client is the largest trader with a particular broker. The clearest way to show this is to prove the existence of an equilibrium in which the smaller client (B) would prefer to completely forego the services of the first broker and instead, concentrate all of their trading with the second broker. In the process B may become the largest client of the second broker. To obtain this equilibrium requires the assumption of increasing returns to scale in broker services. The simplest way to model increasing returns is through the fixed fee each client has to pay for dealing with the broker. This fee can be exogenous, or chosen by the broker. We model the first case for simplicity.
A fixed cost equilibrium
If there were a non-trivial fixed cost of using a broker, the ensuing equilibrium could be such that the second client chooses not to buy from the first broker. 
where:
. Solving, we obtain:
Let ,
Substituting into the demand functions, we obtain:
Next we determine the condition under which client B demands more than half of the second broker's services:
. This is equivalent to:
or
Thus, given the increasing returns induced by the fixed fee, the second client will take more than half of the capacity of the second broker, while foregoing the services of the first broker altogether. This can occur when the two clients are not too different in their valuations {Q B , Q A }. Conceptually, any form of increasing returns, whether exogenously determined as in this example, or endogenous, could result in a bunching equilibrium. Brokers may prefer one equilibrium to the other. The first equilibrium involves more competition between brokers, but also more competition between the clients. The second equilibrium is a less competitive environment.
Commissions in our framework
In the equilibria presented above, a per-share commission can be easily calculated as the per share amount required to generate the service fee given the client's equilibrium trading volume. Denote by q ij the equilibrium share volume sent by client i to broker j, which is the decision variable of client i. The per-share commission each client pays is computed from the total payment required for the service, and the volume allocated to each broker. The per share commission paid by client i to broker j, which we denote by c ji is therefore, just the ratio of the required payment for the service, and the volume sent by the client to the broker:
Notice that while the commission is expressed in per share terms, it represents the average payment, rather than the marginal cost of execution. This is a new way of looking at the commission contract. The empirical evidence presented below supports our alternative view of commissions.
We contend that equilibria with more brokers and clients will exhibit similar features to this simple 2 by 2 case. A bunching equilibrium could exist in a world with many clients and many brokers. The largest institutions will tend to be important clients to many brokers. But large institutions will not necessarily be the most important clients for every broker. Smaller institutions must concentrate their trades with a few brokers in order to obtain their desired level of broker services. Brokers rank clients in a queue;
allocating the best services to those clients who choose to pay the fee. Because fee payments are tracked by per share commissions, in a bunching equilibrium small institutions will trade relatively more with their top brokers than large institutions do. We test this implication of the model using a proprietary database of institutional trades. This data and the accompanying tests are described in the next sections.
Data, hypotheses and empirical results
The data used to test our hypotheses consists of 651,183 trades by 305 institutional investors executed between January 1, 1997 and March 31, 1997. Sixty percent of all block trades (above 50,000) are charged these two commissions. We speculate that the distribution of commissions suggests that there are essentially two types of trades in the database. Full service trades, usually charging 5 or 6 cents per share and execution-only trades charging 3 cents per share or less.
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We examine the breakdown of these trades across different size brokers and clients in section 4.2.
The size of the institutional client is important to several of our hypotheses. To understand more about the different institutions in the database, we first sort the clients into five quintiles, ranked by trading volume, and examine aggregate trading statistics by quintile. What is immediately evident in Table 1 is that trading activity is skewed towards the largest clients. The high-volume quintile dominates the other quintiles in terms of total trading volume, total trades and total commissions paid to brokers. The trading activity of the smallest 80 percent of all institutions is only 21 percent of the total number of transactions, with the largest quintile executing the bulk of all transactions. As trade size also rises with client size, from a total share volume perspective, these discrepancies are even larger. Clearly, the largest institutions are going to be desired customers for all brokers.
From our perspective, this brings up the interesting question of how the smallest 80 percent of all institutions compete for broker services. We postulate that the smaller brokers will tend to bunch their trades among fewer brokers, perhaps concentrating their full-service trades among the smaller brokers where they obtain adequate levels of broker services from relatively small trading volumes. analyze the importance of each cells trading volume relative to the total volume separating trades into those that charge 5 cents or more per share (full-service trades) and those trades that charge less than five cents per trade (execution-only trades).
Client trading by broker size
The most striking result in Table 2 is that trading volume is strongly skewed toward the largest clients executing with the largest brokers. Over sixty-five percent of total volume is trades by the largest institutions with the largest brokers where the commission cost is at least five cents per share. An additional twenty five percent of all volume is accounted for by the execution-only trades of this group. In terms of aggregate volume, all institutional trading on Wall Street is essentially the largest institutions trading with the largest brokers.
Nevertheless there are some interesting patterns in overall full-service volume that are evident in the table. Consider, for example, the full-service trades of the smallest institutions. The three smallest client quintiles all do less trading with the largest broker quintile than they do with some other broker quintiles. This result is counterintuitive, because total trading volume increases as broker quintiles go from 1 to 5. However, this result is consistent with our hypotheses. Smaller clients choose to concentrate their trades with the smaller brokers. With little chance of competing in the queue for services with the larger brokers, the smaller institutions tend to concentrate their trades with brokers to which they are relatively important. This tendency to bunch trading with particular brokers is explicitly documented in Table 3 .
Average commission costs are relatively constant across the twenty-five cells. One notable exception is that the largest client-broker quintile per-share commissions are the lowest average in the table. This finding tends to support our contention that the largest clients provide enough volume-based revenue to the brokers that large clients can achieve some cost per share discount. The data in Table 3 indicate a very skewed allocation of client trades among brokers. The largest institutions send 20% of their total volume to their top broker, 17%
Evidence on institutional clustering of trades
to the next two, 11% to the following two, and 17% to the next five. The smallest institutions concentrate their trading even more, they send 38% of their trading volume to their top broker, 25% to the next two largest brokers, 12% to the next two, and 18% to the next five. These results contradict the naïve assumption that clients want to hide their trading strategies by maximizing the number of brokers they use. There must be a strong reason to deviate from that strategy, namely the benefits from moving up higher in the queue for broker services. These results are consistent with our model. Notice that the existence of fixed costs of dealing with every broker would also prompt smaller clients to reduce the number of brokers they engage. However, this simple story would not explain the asymmetry of dealings with brokers that we document.
The middle panel of Table 3 Particularly relevant to our argument is the explanatory power of QVOL, the quintile rank of the client. We make the argument that larger client's can easily reach their desired fixed fees because their total trading volumes are so large. We speculate in our discussion of Table 3 that the commissions per share charged to the largest clients could be lower than the commissions for smaller clients for this reason. We view the fact that client size is the most important variable in this regression as further confirmation of our hypothesis.
Determinants of commissions per share
Panels B and C present commissions per share regressions that separate the data into execution-only transactions, 0-3 commissions per share, and research transactions, which charge between 3 and 8 cents per share. In Panel B, execution-only trades, the size of the client adds very little explanatory power to the regression. This result is consistent with our contention that the execution-only market is competitive and priced at marginal cost. We do not expect to see volume discounts in this sub-sample. In contrast to these results, QVOL is the variable with the greatest explanatory power in Panel C; a regression using only the research trades. For research trades commissions per share 8 Commissions per share are truncated at 8 cents to minimize the effect of outliers on the regression exhibit volume discounts that are consistent with our hypotheses.
Trading efficiency around information events
If our hypothesis on the client-broker relationship is correct, we should expect to find some tangible benefit from a higher position in the queue for information. To investigate this we have collected a sample of brokerage-specific analysts' recommendation changes that previous research has shown to be informative events (Elton, Gruber and Grossman, 1986 , Womack, 1996 , and Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001 . We examine the pattern of client trading at the time of these information events. If certain clients are preferred and get earlier or more complete information prior to other clients, then trading gains are possible for these clients. We test if the trading patterns in our data are consistent with this hypothesis by examining the profitability of client trades at the time the analyst report is released.
Our sample of analysts' recommendation changes consists of 441 upgrades or downgrades on NYSE-listed stocks that were recorded by the Dow Jones News Service in the first quarter of 1997. The Dow Jones News Service analysts' reports are timestamped so that we know when the reports became public, although public dissemination may occur after dissemination to important clients. The analysts' reports are issued exclusively by brokers in our largest quintile. Table 5 presents the average event-day abnormal returns for the analysts' recommendation changes. Our purpose is not to examine the market reaction to these events, but rather to confirm that they are information events, as measured by abnormal returns, and that the market reaction is consistent with previous research. The event day is defined as the day the report was released if the report is time-stamped before the close of trading and the following day if the report is time-stamped after the NYSE 4:00 close.
Abnormal returns are estimated using market excess returns on the event day. CRSP provides the raw security returns and the value-weighted market returns for the coefficients.
calculation of market excess returns. Our sample of analysts' upgrades and downgrades produces significant abnormal returns. Upgrades produce an average abnormal return of 2.27% (t-statistic = 10.14) and downgrades produce and average abnormal return of 2.98% (t-statistic = -7.80). The only statistically insignificant analysts' recommendations are upgrades to a hold recommendation.
This background analysis allows us to state that we find analyst recommendations to be information events as measured by abnormal returns and therefore trading in these stocks on these days may provide better than average profit or loss avoidance opportunities. With the daily closing price as a benchmark, we can determine the trading efficacy of institutions that execute trades on these high-information days. Further, we can examine whether trading profits, if they exist, are related to the nature of the clientbroker relationship. Table 6 presents an analysis of client trades on the day analysts' change their recommendations. We compare the execution costs of trades through the broker that issues the analyst's recommendation against trading through other brokers.
Institutional trading on analysts' information
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This is a powerful and direct test of the informational value of being a client of a research broker.
Clients who traded that day through the recommending broker are by definition clients of that broker.
We find that trades through the initiating broker on the day of the recommendation change paid higher commissions (5.56 cents), while trades in the same stock on the same day through any other broker paid lower commissions (4.68 cents).
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. We use the buy and sell indicator variables in our data and the price of the trade to calculate trade profitability. These results are strongly consistent with the model's suggestion that for broker services such as information, the place in the queue matters, and that brokers inform some clients earlier than others.
Conclusion
Timmons (2000) claims that brokers treat their preferred institutional clients to privileged information. If her assertion is true, then brokers must have a mechanism that determines the relative importance of an institutional client. We start from the natural premise that the broker's preferred clients will be those providing the largest revenues to the brokerage firm. We model the total revenue paid to a broker as a fixed fee, clients optimally select their desired level of broker services and pay the associated fixed fee through commissions per share on their trades. Thus, commission per share represents an average per share cost of broker services. This result contrasts with the prevailing view of per share commissions as a transaction cost that is priced at marginal cost.
One example of a brokerage service that is allocated across clients is access to information, not all information reaches all parties at the same time. Thus, the receipt of information earlier provides the opportunity for profit to those who receive it.
Commissions represent a way for clients to pay the brokers not only for the information, but also for the its timely receipt. As position in the queue to receive information is a 9 The sample size in table 6 is 433. Eight Dow Jones analysts' recommendations could not be matched to scare resource, brokers are more likely to provide this scarce resource to those that will pay the most. In response, clients who would otherwise try to disguise their trades by using many brokers will instead try to buy their way up the queue by concentrating their trades across a few brokers.
We present a model of the allocation of brokers' services, such as a place in the queue for information, and show that a fixed payment mechanism is both an equilibrium and efficient. Empirical results indicate that clients, consistent with attempts to buy their way up the queue, bunch or concentrate their trades, and that smaller firms pay higher commissions than larger firms to their top brokers. Other empirical results indicate that brokerage recommendations do affect stock prices, and that clients who trade through initiating brokers on the day of the recommendation make profitable trades while clients who trade elsewhere do not. These results are consistent with the model and with information being disseminated to brokers' best clients first, with clients paying more for the privilege of being higher in the queue and receiving information earlier than the rest of the market.
stocks on the Abel-Noser database. Madhavan A., and D. Keim, 1995 
Table 4 Institutional Commissions
This table presents the results of regressions using commissions per share as the dependent variable. Commissions per share are truncated at 8 cents a share; which leaves a sample size of 644,492. Shares is the trade size, price is the trade price. Percent market is the size of the trade divided by the daily volume in the traded stock. QVOL is the client's quintile rank from Table 2 , BQVOL measures the broker-client relationship, and it is measured as the rank of the executing broker across all trades from that client. Panel A uses all observations. Panel B estimates the determinants of per share commissions for 146,210 trades where the commission per share is less than or equal to three cents per share (Execution Only trades). Panel C estimates the determinants of commissions for 498,281 trades where the where commission per share is between three and eight cents per share (Research trades). All commission per share figures are rounded to the nearest 1/10 of a cent. 
